The common-sense view about what matters
We ordinary people desire various things for our futures. At the most general level, we want our futures to go well rather than badly, whatever we take their going 'well' and 'badly' to consist in. More basic than this desire is the desire that we should have futures. We want to continue to survive from one moment to the next. This desire for continued survival, along with the attendant beliefs and attitudes (such as the belief that being shot is likely to frustrate this desire and the disposition to fear murderous gunmen) I shall call the concern for future survival.
What does it take to satisfy my desire for continued survival? To borrow a term from David Lewis, a 'platitude of common sense ' (1976a: 18) has it that my desire is satisfied iff the person I am now exists in the future; that is, iff there is a future person with whom I am identical. On this view, what matters in survival is personal identity (for brevity, simply 'identity'). Derek Parfit has challenged this view by observing that one can imagine oneself undergoing certain processes that do not interrupt what matters, but do interrupt identity. One such process is fission: I divide into two people, each of whom is bodily and psychologically very similar to me, but neither of whom is identical with me. 1 Parfit believes, for well-known reasons that will not be rehearsed here, that the relation between me and my fission products contains everything that matters to me in survival. Since this relation is not identity, observes Parfit, the desire for survival found in S cannot be the common-sense kind. Parfit (1976) argued that Lewis's attempt to preserve the common-sense view has implications contrary to common sense. Imagine a case of fission in which one fission product dies immediately after fission. On Lewis's view, this involves two people, C 1 and C 2 , who share pre-fission person-stage S. After fission, C 1 dies and C 2 survives. S has a common-sense desire for survival 'on behalf' (Lewis 1983: 74) of both C 1 and C 2 , yet since C 2 survives long after fission while C 1 does not, C 2 's pre-fission desire for survival is satisfied while C 1 's is not. Therefore, Lewis concedes that 'there is a limit to how commonsensical one's desires can possibly be under the peculiar circumstance of stage-sharing ' (1983: 74) , and argues that S's desire is best interpreted as 'Let at least one of us survive'. As such, both C 1 and C 2 's desire for survival is satisfied. However, as Theodore Sider (2001) What does the fact that ordinary people are concerned for their future survival tell us about the sort of things that they are? Among other things, I suggest that it entails that their future survival and demise are both real possibilities, and that they are aware of this: concern for one's future survival, if it could never be jeopardised, would be as misconceived as concern that one's birth date should remain unchanged.
Parfit's objection
A being whose survival cannot be jeopardised, then, cannot properly be concerned for its future survival 6 -at least (as we shall see), not in the way that ordinary people are.
Here lies a problem for cohabitation. In the case of a person who shares at least one person-stage with at least one other person, let us say that, during those shared stages, she is a 'cohabiting person' or a 'cohabitant'. According to the cohabitation views considered here, a person-stage's being a pre-fission stage determines that it is cohabited. This determination is logical: from the premises that fission does not interrupt identity, and that fission gives rise to two distinct people where previously there seemed only to be one, it follows that the pre-fission personstage is cohabited. Fission logically determines the cohabitation of the pre-fission person-stage, just as Gordon Brown's election as Prime Minister logically determines that, before election, he is the future Prime Minister. Further, for those elected Prime
Minister at time t, there is nothing more or less involved in being the future Prime 6 It may feel such concern even so, if it is deluded about the sort of being that it is. This does not entail that it is a proper subject of such concern. Similarly, that I may feel remorse for a murder that I falsely believe I have committed does not entail that I am a proper subject of such remorse.
Minister at any earlier time t -n than being elected Prime Minister at t; and for those who fission at t, there is nothing more or less involved in being cohabited at t -n than fissioning at t. 7 This, I will argue, entails that the survival of cohabiting people, unlike that of ordinary people, cannot be jeopardised. Therefore, cohabitants cannot properly be concerned for their future survival in the way that ordinary people are.
Since there is nothing more or less involved in being cohabited at t -n than fissioning at t, it follows that if person-stage S is cohabited, S's cohabitants cannot die before fission. The survival of S's cohabitants, then, cannot be jeopardised until after fission, and so they cannot properly be concerned for their future survival in the way that ordinary people are. The same point should, it seems, apply to the future Prime Minister: there is nothing more or less involved in being the future Prime Minister at t -n than being elected Prime Minister at t; so if X is the future Prime Minister, X cannot die until after the election. Therefore, X, like S's cohabitants, cannot properly be concerned for his future survival in the way that ordinary people are. This is counterintuitive. What does it mean to say that S's cohabitants, or the future Prime Minister, 'cannot die' before a certain event? Well, I am not suggesting that they are immune to the usual sorts of fatal mishaps: bullets, diseases, etc. Rather, the propositions 'S is cohabited' and 'S's cohabitants will die before fission' are inconsistent, as are 'X is the future Prime Minister' and 'X will die before election'. If the first proposition of each pair is true, then whilst there is one sense in which S's cohabitants can die before fission and X can die before election, there is another sense in which they cannot. These points apply to our discussion of cohabitation. There is a sense in which S's cohabitants can die before fission and X can die before election (because they are vulnerable to fatal mishaps); and a sense in which they cannot (because their doing so is incompatible with certain facts). It is in this latter sense that I have argued that S's cohabitants cannot die before fission, and that X cannot die before election.
As it stands, my argument is unlikely to persuade anybody that S's cohabitants or X cannot properly be concerned for their future survival in the way that ordinary people are. Let us consider two objections to this claim.
Causal and logical constraints
First, the preceding section's argument takes the truth of some statement about what happens to X in the future to disqualify X from properly being concerned for his future survival; yet for all people, there are similar true statements about what happens to them in the future. As a result, if X cannot properly be concerned for his future survival, nobody can properly be so concerned. consequently one must acknowledge that they cannot die before fission. One cannot coherently entertain the possibilities both that S is cohabited and that S's cohabitants may die before fission. And, since the survival of S's cohabitants cannot be jeopardised before fission, they cannot properly be concerned for their future survival in the way that ordinary people are.
Guaranteed survival
Second, does it follow that, since S's cohabitants cannot die until after fission, they cannot properly be concerned for their future survival before fission? One might suppose that, before fission, they can properly be concerned for their future survival Parfitian account from rejecting the common-sense view.
Conclusion
Fission is philosophically interesting because it presents an opportunity to analyse what matters in survival to ordinary people; specifically, it presents an opportunity to evaluate the common-sense view. To serve this purpose, it must be the case that the people involved in fission can properly be concerned for their survival in the way that ordinary people are. The cohabitation view of fission, whilst initially appearing to reconcile the common-sense view with the view that what matters is preserved through fission, ultimately fails to do so because cohabitants cannot properly be concerned for their future survival in the way that ordinary people are. 
